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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D.C.
2 November 1950

No. 13

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no indications of the probability of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. It cannot now be determined whether the present limited intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea is for defensive or offensive purposes, but the action does indicate Chinese attempts to prolong the Korean war and Communist assumption of the risk of a further extension of the conflict. There are reports of defensive preparations in Manchuria and of further northward movements of Chinese Communist troops but definite indications of future Chinese Communist courses of action are lacking.
- c. Communist activity elsewhere in Asia continues to indicate an aggressive expansionist policy, with indications of increasing Viet Minh capabilities, with Chinese Communist forces advancing towards Tibet, and increased insurgent preparations in the Philippines and Indonesia.
- d. Although the political and military situation in Europe has been relatively quiet, there are no indications that the U.S.S.R. is preparing to adopt a conciliatory policy on any major issue.

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. KOREA.--Chinese Communist troops have entered the Korean fighting, apparently in small numbers but as organized units. Renewed air opposition, including jet fighters, has been encountered. The pretext for Chinese Communist intervention may be the protection of the hydroelectric installations on the Korean-Manchurian border, but the move indicates preparations to prolong the Korean conflict, either by guerrilla tactics or by offensive operations. Hurried and extensive defense preparations have been reported in Mukden, Manchuria,

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and there are reports of a further northward movement of Chinese Communist field forces. Chinese Communist statements provide no indication of a psychological preparation of their people for war in Korea, nor does other information clearly establish the objective of the present limited Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

- b. CHINA.--Troop movements and other information continue to indicate that the invasion of Formosa has been postponed.
 - c. TIBET.--Chinese Communist troops have advanced further westward in Chinese Tibet and they may invade Tibet proper in the near future. The threat of invasion may also be intended to influence political negotiations on Tibet.
 - d. INDO-CHINA.--There are no new indications of an immediate Viet Minh offensive or a Chinese Communist invasion. There is continuing evidence of improved Viet Minh equipment and supply shipments from China.
 - e. SOUTHEAST ASIA.--In the Philippines, the Luks are reportedly planning uprisings during November and are making long-range preparations for the establishment of a regular army. Indonesian Communists may be preparing for guerrilla operations and the security situation there is deteriorating.
 - f. EUROPE.--No significant military developments have been reported. Soviet Army units apparently are returning to winter garrisons in Germany. There are no indications of a further Soviet move with regard to a German peace treaty. Soviet action in Austria is designed to undermine the authority of the Austrian Government in the Soviet Zone.
 - g. GENERAL.--Soviet political actions of the past few weeks, in the U.N. and elsewhere, provide no indications that the U.S.S.R. has changed its position on any basic issue or is preparing to adopt a policy of conciliation towards the West.
3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--No major change has been apparent during the period but Communist capabilities for aggressive military action and insurgent activity in the Far East are apparently increasing.

* See paragraph 1, a, (1) of Tab "A" for the nature of the organization of these units.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

**Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
1 November 1950**

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. The capture and interrogation of Chinese Communist prisoners of war in Korea within the past week has established that troops of the Chinese Communist Army are operating in Korea. At the same time, air opposition, including jet aircraft, has been encountered, indicating either that the North Korean Air Force has been furnished additional Soviet aircraft or that outside air intervention has also begun. There are no conclusive indications as to the objective of the unannounced Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

(1) According to the statements of Chinese Communist prisoners, the Chinese troops which have entered Korea have included: elements of the 124th Division, 42d Army, which crossed the Yalu about 16 October and proceeded to the area of the Chosen and Fusen dams; and units designated as the 54th, 55th and 56th units which were apparently formed from divisions of the Chinese Communist 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies, with unit strengths reported between 2,000 and 5,000 men. The "56th" unit, which entered Korea from Antung on 20 October, was apparently destined for the Suiho Dam area, and was reportedly designated as a unit of the "Chinese Peace Preservation Army in Korea." The North Korean Sinuiju radio on 31 October broadcast an announcement released by the "People's Volunteer Forces Headquarters" that a volunteer corps had been formed for the protection of the hydroelectric zone, and that Chinese People's Liberation forces are concentrated on the Manchurian side of this zone. Apart from this one announcement from a North Korean radio, no statement has been issued by the Communists with regard to the Chinese intervention in Korea.

(2) Renewed air opposition in Korea was encountered on 31 October and 1 November in the area of the Manchurian border. New aircraft were observed on the Sinuiju field and sweptback wing jets on the Manchurian side of the river. U. S. aircraft were attacked by conventional type YAK's in the area of Sinuiju and by jet aircraft, tentatively identified as MIG-15's, near Sonchong, where one damaged enemy jet escaped across the Yalu. The MIG-15, which is one of the latest Soviet jet fighter types, has been previously operational in China, but has not hitherto been encountered

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- (3) Other recent reports have indicated unusual Chinese Communist defense measures in Manchuria. According to sources believed reliable, extensive air raid precautions have been undertaken in Mukden, the city is under martial law, and factories, machinery and families of prominent Communists are being moved north. Jet fighters and self-propelled guns were also reported in Mukden, and military rail traffic between Mukden and Antung has reportedly been heavy during the past few weeks.

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- (4) For the past several weeks reports [redacted] [redacted] indicated an inland and northward movement of the Third Field Army from the Formosa invasion coast. Recent reports [redacted] [redacted] now state there has been a heavy northward movement of troops and equipment from the Shanghai-Nanking area towards Tsingtao and the North China area and that elements of the Third Field Army seem to be involved. Although not entirely confirmed, these reports have indicated a continuing build-up of forces in the Northeast in excess of peace-time needs and in addition to the Fourth Field Army troops which were previously deployed to Manchuria.

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- (5) There continues to be no indication from Chinese Communist propaganda of a psychological preparation of the Chinese people for a military intervention in Korea, although Chinese propaganda has continued to reiterate that China "cannot be indifferent" to U.S. aggression in Korea and that Chinese aid must be extended to Korea. The absence of any announcement to the Chinese people that Chinese troops have gone into Korea is noteworthy in contrast to the usual policy of extensive prior publicity for Communist military operations and would suggest that they are not preparing for extended military operations in Korea. Recent reports on alleged Chinese Communist plans have also provided no clear indication of the extent of intervention which may be intended. Within the past week conflicting reports from sources of dubious reliability have stated on the one hand that the Chinese Communists decided in August to intervene in Korea and that the delay has been caused by the necessity of marshalling sufficient military strength and making defensive preparations; and on the other that the Chinese had decided against intervention because of U.N. air superiority and that they have no intention of sending more troops into Korea than those which are now there.

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- (6) In the light of all information presently available, it cannot be determined whether the ultimate intent of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is defensive or offensive. The size and organization of Chinese Communist units in Korea indicates a possible policy of forming small composite task forces from regular divisions in Manchuria; to date there has been no apparent movement into Korea in strength and there is no indication that divisional or army headquarters are being moved into Korea. The manner of reported deployment of Chinese troops and the strategic nature of the area may indicate that the object is to establish a corridor or cordon sanitaire along the Manchurian-Korean border to protect the vital power plants which are estimated to provide Manchuria with one-third of their output of 300,000 KW. If the major concern of the Chinese Communists is the protection of the hydroelectric installations, however, it appears that official announcement of their intention to preserve their rights to these installations would have better served their interests than an unannounced intervention with the attendant risk of retaliatory attacks on these same installations. The Chinese Communists' action thus suggests that their purpose is to prolong the struggle in Korea, and that the present small-scale movement into Korea may be either an effort to establish a secure base for harassing and guerrilla operations or a delaying operation to permit a further build-up of Chinese Communist strength for offensive operations in Korea. The hurried preparations reported in the Mukden area suggest that the Chinese Communists are genuinely fearful of air attacks on their territory, although it cannot be concluded from this what the nature of their future military action will be. The fact that the Chinese Communists have intervened at all, however, indicates their assumption of a risk that the conflict may be further extended.

b. The reported continued inland and northward movement of Third Field Army troops is a further indication that an attack on Formosa is not intended in the near future. There are also definite indications of a continuing shortage of POL products in China, which would limit Chinese Communist capabilities for extended military operations except in areas, such as Manchuria, which have more ready access to Soviet petroleum supplies. According to recent reliable reports, a number of jet aircraft are now operating at Hung Jao airfield, Shanghai. Concurrent, although unconfirmed, reports of a movement of large numbers of Soviet aviation personnel from Shanghai may indicate that increasing numbers of planes are being turned over to the Chinese Communists.

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c. Press reports of the past week that Chinese Communist forces are in Tibet and that the invasion has been confirmed by the Indian Government actually refer to the movement of Chinese Communist forces in Inner or Chinese Tibet rather than to an invasion of Tibet proper. According to latest reports, Chinese Communist troops are still 200 miles from Lhasa and have not crossed the highest passes into Tibet. The reports do indicate, however, that Chinese Communist forces have advanced further westward and that they are already operating over difficult and mountainous terrain. A further report on the Chinese Communist airlift for the Tibetan operation states that six aircraft have been utilized to move supplies for the past six weeks. Chinese Communist underground operators are alleged to have been sent into Tibet about the first of October. The fact that the advance towards Tibet proper is evidently under way indicates either that the Chinese Communists will invade or that the advance is intended to bring about the capitulation of the Tibetans in discussions in Peiping.

d. There is little new information with regard to immediate Viet Minh intentions in Indo-China. There are no new indications of a Chinese Communist intention to invade Indo-China and reports of the presence of several Chinese Communist regiments are believed actually to refer to troops from the border area whose nationality is difficult to determine. There are reports of Chinese Communist advisers in fairly low echelons of the Viet Minh Army. The first use of AA rockets by the Viet Minh has been reported, and an unevaluated report states that jet aircraft have arrived in South China near the Indo-China border. There are indications that Hainan Island is being increasingly utilized as a base for supply to the Viet Minh, which will facilitate the movement of supplies into Annam.

e. In the Philippines, there are reports that the insurgent Huks are planning general uprisings in Manila and elsewhere on or about 7 November and that these operations will probably be undertaken at approximately that time despite the recent capture of a number of Huks and the revelation of their plans. There are also indications from captured documents that the Huks are planning to form a regular army and that the plan had anticipated that an army of 116,000 men would be ready for the "final offensive" some time after November 1951.

f. In other areas of Southeast Asia, there are also indications of increasing Communist pressure. The Indonesian Communist (Stalinist) Party may be preparing for guerrilla action; contacts with Chinese Communist groups in Indonesia and the smuggling of military supplies and advisers from China have been reported. The over-all security situation shows signs of further deterioration, partly as a result of Communist activity. In Burma, the Government's decision to receive a Soviet Ambassador will open another channel for exertion of Communist pressure; Rangoon already has a Chinese Communist Embassy and an active Viet Minh colony.

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g. In the Soviet Far East, a U.S. reconnaissance plane on a mission over the Gulf of Anadyr observed planes which from the speed of flight are estimated to have been jets and which are believed to have been based at Chaplino on the extreme southeast tip of the Chukotsk Peninsula. There have been previous indications of jet activity in this area but sufficient evidence to confirm their presence has been lacking.

h. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) It cannot now be determined whether the present limited and unannounced intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea is for defensive or offensive purposes, but the action does indicate an intention of prolonging the Korean war and Chinese assumption of the risk of a further extension of the conflict. There are indications of defensive preparations in Manchuria and of the further deployment of Chinese Communist field forces northward.
- (2) There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa and Chinese Communist troop movements further confirm that the attack has been postponed.
- (3) Chinese Communist forces are advancing towards the Tibetan border and may invade Tibet proper in the near future.
- (4) There are no clear indications of the Viet Minh course of action in the immediate future or of a Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-China.
- (5) There are indications of increased Communist aggressiveness in Southeast Asia generally and of preparations for intensified Communist insurgent operations in the Philippines and Indonesia.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. In Germany, there are now indications that Soviet Army units are gradually returning to home stations, although this is not fully confirmed as yet. There are reports that elements of the Second and Fourth Guards Mechanized Armies conducted joint maneuvers in the Templin area north of Berlin following the conclusion of the previously reported exercises in the Magdeburg area. No further information is available on the arrival of new Soviet troops in Germany and there is as yet no indication that a demobilization of older troops in Germany has started.

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b. The U.S.S.R. has made no move to date to initiate Four-Power discussions on Germany and there are no current indications that the U.S.S.R. intends to follow up demands for a German peace treaty advanced in the Prague Declaration. There has been an apparent lessening of Communist pressure on Western Berlin during the past few weeks in contrast to the mounting pressure which was evident throughout the spring and summer and which seemed designed to culminate in some sort of action to undermine the position of the West in Berlin. In Austria, on the other hand, the Soviet Union is following a course of action designed to undermine the authority of the Austrian Government in the Soviet Zone, specifically through refusal to permit any disciplinary action against Austrian police in connection with the September-October Communist disturbances.

c. No significant military activity has been reported in Southeast Europe during the week. There have been no reports of a further build-up of Eastern European Satellite forces, other than continuing indications that the Free German Youth are receiving glider training in apparent preparation for the establishment of an East German Air Force. Increasing surveillance and interference with U. S. Attache field trips in Poland may be intended as a preliminary to the further curtailment of Western observations in that country.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. The recent sighting of a probable radar ground control station at Voronezh (about 250 miles south of Moscow) for use in direction of fighter aircraft is a further indication of the build-up of Soviet air defenses. Voronezh is an important industrial center as well as a logical strategic point for outer air defense of the Moscow area.


b. A review of Soviet political actions and propaganda statements of the past several weeks does not indicate that the U.S.S.R. has embarked on a new course designed to reduce tension with the West. Although the Soviet Union has made various gestures in the U.N. and elsewhere which are susceptible of being interpreted as a more conciliatory policy toward the West, Soviet moves to date do not indicate a change of position on any basic issue and Soviet proposals have been confined almost entirely to a renewal of old demands in a more attractive guise. The only possible exceptions to this have been in the Soviet position on the drafting of a Japanese peace treaty and on atomic inspection, but in these cases also the essential features of previous policy have remained unchanged. Despite rumors there has been no concrete change in Soviet trade policies towards Western Europe, and though Moscow has shown a new interest in negotiating trade agreements, the Soviet position in actual treaty discussions has shown little change. Soviet propaganda against the West is undiminished in vituperation and there are numerous areas, as indicated in previous sections of this report, where the U.S.S.R. and its Satellites are applying increase rather than lessened pressure.

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c. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Available intelligence does not indicate the probability of any Soviet or Satellite military move in Europe in the immediate future.
- (2) There is no indication that the U.S.S.R. has adopted or is preparing to adopt a policy of conciliation toward the West, and the Soviet Union has not altered its position on any basic issues.


JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee

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